Vladimir Bernstein, May, 2015

For the vast majority of Russians, there could be no doubt about the decisive role of the Soviet Union in the second world war’s victory, because it was the Soviet Union that suffered the greatest losses (at least 20 million dead) and it was the Soviet army that defeated the mighty Wehrmacht and liberated Europe. The Allies participated in the war by conducting relatively small military operations in Africa and Italy, provided some material support, and actually entered the war only in June 1944 (Normandy Invasion), when the outcome of the war was already predetermined, and with the only goal of preventing “Soviets” from capturing entire Europe. Almost all of the heavy burden of this war lay down on the USSR and the marginal participation of the allies only helped to accelerate the events.

Some aspects of this conventional picture do not add up. The first question is how the biggest army in the world (USSR) [1], appeared to be unable to stop the much smaller German army? The standard answer was — an element of surprise, which could be a reasonable explanation for a tactical retreat over the first few weeks, but not for the surrender of more than half of the heavily populated European part of the country. Of course, the Russian winter and logistical problems related to the vast territories contributed to the slowdown of the German’s advance. Still, an unbiased look at the first-year development leads to the conclusion that the Soviet military machine was less effective than the German, and the first blow was a devastating one.

This leads to the second question: how the country with a significantly damaged smaller economy and a half-destroyed army was able not only to match the overwhelming industrial might of the Axis but also, to overgrow and eventually defeat it? The conventional answer is that USSR has survived thanks to the superhuman effort of the Soviet people, which was proved by the disproportionately high casualties (at least 7 times higher than the German losses), vast Soviet’s territories, and freezing winter, which Germens were not prepared for. Yes, the brutal Stalin’s totalitarian regime forced millions of Soviets to fight without adequate ammunition, under poor command thus being slaughtered by the German’s military machine in big numbers. Yes, the overstretched German supply lines and lack of adequate winter clothing slowed down the German’s advance, but it still cannot explain the long-term outcome of the war.

Common sense suggests that the outcome of a major global war that involves the most developed countries and lasts for 6 years depends not on the soldier’s bravery or quality of command and not even on the numerical superiority and quality of weapons (excluding nuclear), but rather on the ability to produce weapons, ammunition, and other military supplies. In other words, it seems logical to assume that for the sides with similar size and level of technological sophistication, the deciding factor would be the economic potential and the winning side should have significantly higher gross domestic product (GDP) numbers. Let’s try to look at the events of the Second World War, from this perspective.

The chart below shows the GDP trend of the countries that participated in WWII over the period between 1938 and 1945 [1].

GDP trend of the member states of the Second World War from 1938 to 1945

Emphasis is placed on two facts: first — until 1941 the GDP of Russia and Germany practically matched each other, and second — the GDP of the US significantly exceeds the GDP of other countries, and the gap has steadily increased throughout the period under review.

From September 1939 to June 22, 1941, the USSR had close economic, political, and military ties with Germany, which led to the joined occupation of Poland, Romania, the Baltic countries, and Finland. Interestingly, as opposed to Germany, which let the occupied countries to retained their independent status, the Soviet Union annexed the occupied territories, which explains some growth in the GDP in 1940.

Now, let us take a look at the dynamics of the GDP of the opposing coalitions in the same time period with and without the United States. As the graph below shows, in 1939, at the WWII starting point, the total GDP of the Allies (Britain and France) amounted to $486 billion, while the Axis countries (Austria, Germany, Italy, and Japan) had a combined GDP – $746 billion, which gave Axis 53% advantage (using Allies as a base). In 1940, due to the occupation of France, the balance shifted even further — England was left alone with a GDP of $316 billion against the Axis with the GDP growing up to $917 billion. This gave the Axis a whopping 190% advantage, leaving England no chance to succeed.

In June 1941, after Germany attacked the USSR, the overall Allies’ GDP increased to $703 billion (vs. $911 billion of the Axis block) with the addition of the USSR. This still gave Axis about a 30% advantage (using Allies as a base), which in 1942 would grow to 51% as a result of capturing a large part of the USSR by Germany.

GDP trend of Allies vs. Axis with and without the participation of the United States.

Thus in 1942, the economic power of the Axis surpassed the Allies (without the United States) by 51%. And this does not take into account that the US influenced the situation indirectly even without joining the fight by supplying the war materials and participating in the hostilities at sea, thus reducing the real economic activity of the Axis and stimulating the Allies. Therefore, in case of complete exclusion of the USA, the starting gap between Axis and Allies GDP would be even greater and would continue growing over time, which invariably would lead to the capitulation of the Allies.

But in 1941 the United States entered the war and radically changed the balance of GDP in favor of the Allies. Together with the US in 1941 allies had a GDP of $1,797 billion vs. $911 billion of the Axis, and in 1942 – $1,862 billion against $902 billion. This amounts to about 100% advantage, which in the following years grew steadily (mainly due to the growth of the United States economy) up to 150% in 1944 and reached 300%  by the end of the war.

So, by entering WWII the United States dramatically changed the economic balance between the fighting camps giving the Allies a huge advantage. But the economic potentiality does not mean real participation, therefore, to obtain a complete picture we try to assess the volume of produced and used in the hostilities weapons, ammunition, and other materials by each participant. The following chart shows the distribution of military spending between the fighting countries and coalitions.

The military spending among the participants of the WWII

As you can see from this chart, the Allies’ military spending accounted for 61% of the total, which is 56% higher than for the Axis. The following chart shows the ratio of military spending of countries within each of the groups.

Percentage ratio between military spending countries
each member of the coalition.

Expectedly, Germany carried 65% of all the Axis military expenses, but the fact that US military spending accounted for more than half of the Allies’ total, while the Soviet Union’s spending was only 30%, does not look trivial. The volume of produced weapons and related materials corresponds to the financial contribution. For example, the numbers below represent the USSR military production as a percentage of all Allies’ volume.

Jets: 18%
Heavy weapons: 46%
Light Weapons: 28%
Navy: 2%
Transportation: 5%
Natural Resources: 13%

Of course, history has no subjunctive mood, however, even simple mechanical subtraction of the US share from the total military spending would give Axis a 16% advantage over the Allies.

The percentage of military spending of the Allies and Axis excluding the United States.

In real life, exclusion of the United States would not only deprive the allies of more than half of material resources but also inevitably would change the dynamics of the war, accelerating the military growth of the ‘Axis’ and slowing down the production of the Allied side. All these lead to an obvious conclusion that without the USA the outcome of World War II would be different.

The withdrawal of the Soviet Union would keep allies with a minimal advantage in the military expenditures (5%), but with a significant advantage in the GDP (about 50%). It would probably seriously prolong the war without changing its outcome, but the atomic bomb would end it at about the same time.

[1] — Military production during World War II (Wikipedia)